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Quantloader serving NetWire RAT

Follow the C2i tracker for block-lists. 

Here’s a look at what good old Quant is serving at this time:

Most of the modus operandi is same old — firewall rules, new processes etc.
There isn’t much effort to hide:

Haven’t looked at it much since I published this on MalwareBytes blog but here are a few things its still doing:
“cmd /c echo Y|CACLS \”c:\\users\\rem\\appdata\\roaming\\92804119\\dwm.exe\” /P \”REM:R\””
Some good old registry tampering:
“HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run [7]”

Trick to write into the registry:
0061FE34 0040C8C8 “regini C:\\Users\\REM\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\per”
It is using this file that’s created ‘per’ to write the contents into the registry.
0060FE34  |0040B388; |CommandLine = "regini C:\Users\REM\AppData\Local\Temp\per"
In order to write it, it used regini.exe with the above commandline. ‘Per’ is just a txt file.

And after the registry entry has been written, it deletes ‘per’.
0060FECC  [0040265E  ^&@   ; /RETURN from KERNEL32.DeleteFileA to fad.0040265E
0060FED0  /00408170  p@   ; \Name = "C:\Users\REM\AppData\Local\Temp\per"
And here’s the call for the final executable:
0061FED0 00408B90 “"
The executable is not there anymore at the time of this publication but all my OSINT resources point to it being:
NetWire RAT


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